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Introduction
In January 2010 the Director General of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) called for an “informal 
consultation on the future of financing for WHO” and 
in her opening remarks expressed the need to make 
the WHO fit for purpose given the unique health chal-
lenges of the 21st century.1
Margaret Chan referred to the constitutional role 
that WHO has to “act as the directing and co-ordinat-
ing authority on international health work” and stated 
clearly that global health leadership today and for the 
future must be earned through strategic and selective 
engagement. She said, “WHO can no longer aim to 
direct and coordinate all of the activities and policies 
in multiple sectors that influence public health today.” 
This is a clear challenge that she has put to the global 
health community in recognition that WHO’s role 
must be clarified in the face of major change. 
There has been much discussion about improving 
global health governance and even calls for a new 
global health architecture.2 Some authors continue to 
see WHO in the center of such a new configuration. 
Others see it as one organization amongst many oth-
ers, and some consider it outdated. But the role of the 
organization can only be determined if there is greater 
clarity about the various domains of global health 
and its role in relation to them. One problem is that 
in debating the need for better governance and coor-
dination in global health, many analysts focus exclu-
sively on one part of the global health governance 
picture: the complex landscape of health in develop-
ment. It is in this arena of global health that the actors 
have increased exponentially and visibly — disease by 
disease — over the last 20 years, and it is here that 
many new governance mechanisms and institutions 
were developed. The explosion of actors and activities 
in this domain of global health is due in particular to 
a widening resource base for mainly vertical health 
activities. Funding for global health initiatives has 
quadrupled in less than two decades to almost $22 
billion, boosted in particular by United States public 
funding (PEPFAR), corporate donations, and giving 
from private foundations such as the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation.3
But the realm of global health governance is much 
broader. Governance according to Stephen Krasner4 
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includes “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures” according to which 
the international actors operate. Today these clearly 
emerge in a more complex manner than when the 
World Health Organization was the only health game 
in town. As the environment gets more complex, a new 
need for coherence and coordination in global health 
governance is recognized.5 In the crowded landscape 
this is clearly an empty space — a governance void 
— which WHO should fill. WHO’s responsibilities 
lie exactly — in concordance with its constitution — 
in the establishment of principles, norms, and rules 
according to which the wide range of global health 
actors should shape their actions, be they member 
states, donors, foundations, or public-private partner-
ships. The critical difference at the beginning of the 
21st century lies in the decision making procedures of 
how these principles, norms, and rules are developed. 
They call not only for the involvement of the broad 
range of global health actors but also for increased 
transparency and accountability.
Three strategic pathways emerge for the organiza-
tion, all of which imply a new relationship with mem-
ber states, other international bodies and organiza-
tions, civil society, and the private sector:
WHO needs to provide mechanisms and instru-1. 
ments which link the new global health actors 
to the system of multilateral intergovernmental 
institutions. This has become necessary because 
the growth of actors and resources in global 
health is beginning to show negative effects on 
the global health system as a whole by creating 
fragmentation and risky imbalances. Quite sim-
ply put, the “invisible hand” no longer ensures 
that the high number of actors and approaches 
helps achieve the best results — coherence, 
transparency, and accountability are called for. 
WHO needs to engage in new ways with the 2. 
many non-health actors that can influence 
health both positively and negatively. Strategies 
on obesity, alcohol, and climate change all touch 
on a broad mix of policy arenas, sectors and mul-
tiple public and private actors. Health is part of 
geopolitics, security, trade, and foreign policy. 
The recent resolution6 in relation to the report 
of the Commission on the Social Determinants 
of Health for example “requests the Director-
General to work closely with partner agencies in 
the multilateral system on appropriate measures 
that address the social determinants of health 
and promote policy coherence in order to mini-
mize health inequities; and to advocate for this 
topic to be high on global development and 
research agendas.” The organization clearly lacks 
formal institutionalized means of dealing with 
other sectors. 
WHO needs to be better able to fully perform its 3. 
coordination function in relation to the develop-
ment on legal instruments such as the Frame-
work Convention of Tobacco Control7 and the 
revised International Health Regulations8 that 
were adopted in 2003 and 2005 respectively and 
have since come into force. It needs to 
build on these experiences to explore 
other instruments which address 
trans-boundary health challenges and 
the governance of global public goods 
for health. This means allowing for 
the involvement of actors who will be 
contributing to the development of 
these international instruments. This 
could include developing rules of the 
game for health donors.
Our proposal to the WHO — which we have named 
Committee C — tries to respond to this need for new 
decision-making procedures, as well as transparency 
and accountability, and places the proposed mecha-
nism within the World Health Assembly (WHA).9 
We suggest that the WHO use the unique convening 
power of the WHA as well as its rules of procedure to 
construct more effective relationships with the broad 
array of non-state and state actors that have so far not 
been involved in a systematic way, in particular from 
sectors other than health. Our focus is not the coordi-
nation of development donors for health — which we 
do not think of as WHO’s role — but the challenge of 
how their accountability to the global health commu-
nity can be increased in the context of other norma-
tive and strategic dimensions of global health govern-
ance. This will make WHO’s work more complex but 
adjust its governance mechanisms to the new land-
scape and new priorities of global health action. Such 
a move will require the organization and its member 
As the environment gets more complex, a new 
need for coherence and coordination in global 
health governance is recognized. In the crowded 
landscape this is clearly an empty space — a 
governance void — which WHO should fill.
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states to adopt new concepts, skills, instruments, and 
outlooks.10 
We maintain that at this point in time there is a 
unique window of opportunity to move forward. We 
describe Committee C below after reflecting on the 
development of global health governance in the last 
decades. We are under no illusion that one single 
mechanism will resolve the complex challenge out-
lined, but we believe there is every reason for WHO 
to fill a governance void and to attempt governance 
innovation. 
1948 Legitimacy: A Directing and 
Coordinating Authority on International 
Health Work Is Established 
It was a joint declaration by Brazil and China at the 
San Francisco Conference 1945 which called for the 
establishment of an international health organiza-
tion. It stated that the health of all peoples was to be 
seen as fundamental to the achievement of peace and 
security. This broad view on health was enshrined in 
the preamble of the constitution of the organization. 
Membership is open to all sovereign nation states of 
the world — not only U.N. member states — which is 
why the broadest possible title for the organization 
was selected: the World Health Organization. It was 
argued that health is a fundamental right of human 
beings and that international cooperation to the full-
est possible extent is necessary for achieving that pur-
pose. To restrict membership would contradict the 
preamble.11 Consequently, the WHO is the only health 
organization in which all nations states are members 
and have equal representation: one country, one vote. 
This makes its legitimacy different from all other 
health organizations and constitutes its convening 
power. 
Formal-Legal Legitimacy
Legitimacy as a concept can apply to many kinds of 
organizations and authority, and there are different 
sources of legitimacy that various actors can refer 
to.12 Of the global health actors only the WHO has the 
formal-legal legitimacy for the collective action of all 
states — it includes all nation states, small and large, 
weak and strong, rich and poor. This gives it the legiti-
macy within international law provided by the sover-
eign equality of members (States) who consent to cer-
tain rules of diplomacy and procedure, consent to legal 
norms, and an ongoing participation in international 
regimes. In principle the members commit to uphold-
ing certain standards of behavior, and are required to 
justify their conduct in light of those standards. WHO 
is the only organization in global health that is man-
dated by its constitution to “act as the directing and co-
ordinating authority on international health work.”13 
Since its creation, the legitimacy of the United 
Nations (U.N.) system is based on the respect of the 
sovereignty of each member state, with a few and very 
limited exceptions concerning peace-keeping by the 
U.N. Security Council. The WHO draws its legitimacy 
from this base, and member states remain responsi-
ble for the health of their people. A central innovation 
in the WHO Constitution was allowing the organiza-
tion to develop legally binding conventions or agree-
Important Functions of WHO as Defined in 
Chapter 2 of Its Constitution 
(a)  to act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on 
international health work;
(b)  to establish and maintain effective collaboration with 
the United Nations, specialized agencies, govern-
mental health administrations, professional groups 
and such other organizations as may be deemed 
appropriate;
(c)  to assist Governments, upon request, in strengthening 
health services;
 
(g)  to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, 
endemic and other diseases;
 
(i)  to promote, in co-operation with other specialized 
agencies where necessary, the improvement of nu-
trition, housing, sanitation, recreation, economic or 
working conditions and other aspects of environmen-
tal hygiene;
(j)  to promote co-operation among scientific and profes-
sional groups which contribute to the advancement 
of health;
(k)  to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, 
and make recommendations with respect to interna-
tional health matters and to perform such duties as 
may be assigned thereby to the Organization and are 
consistent with its objective;
 
(o)  to promote improved standards of teaching and 
training in the health, medical and related professions;
 
(r)  to assist in developing an informed public opinion 
among all peoples on matters of health;
 
(t)  to standardize diagnostic procedures as necessary;
(u)  to develop, establish and promote international stan-
dards with respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical and 
similar products;
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ments and regulations “with respect to any matter 
within the competence of the Organization” (Articles 
19-22), a function that the organization began to use 
actively only in the early years of the 21st century. It 
has become clear that the development of internation-
ally binding rules and norms needs the authority and 
responsibility of an intergovernmental organization 
backed by the legitimacy of governments. After the 
successful experiences with the Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the new Interna-
tional Health Regulations (IHR), the role of binding 
international law in health has become better under-
stood. Joint vulnerability has allowed for governance 
innovation: for example, the revised International 
Health Regulations have in 2005 been able to intro-
duce elements of action for the organization that tran-
scend the non-interference principle and require full 
transparency from member states. This leads to new 
challenges of coordination and potential areas of con-
flict between member states and the organization and 
to the discussion of strengthening the instrument of 
the IHR through additional components.14 
Other Forms of Legitimacy
As the United Nations technical agency for health, the 
WHO has been able to benefit from another form of 
legitimacy based on knowledge, expertise, and evi-
dence. Meanwhile a wide range of expert organiza-
tions in the global arena are also able to provide this 
type of legitimacy — but they do not have the link to 
formal legal legitimacy, which allows the WHO to be 
a normative and standard-setting organization. Moral 
standing is another critical source of legitimacy, which 
is very important particularly for civil society organi-
zations in global health particularly in relation to 
the human rights agenda. But it has always been an 
absolutely essential source of legitimacy for the WHO. 
The organization is expected to live up to the uni-
versal values on which the United Nations system is 
founded through promoting human rights and access 
to primary health care, addressing health inequalities 
and advocating for health in the face of adversity, for 
example against the global tobacco industry. It is also 
expected to act as a trusted neutral broker. Any hint of 
lack of independence — as contended for example in 
the recent debate on H1N1 — can have serious reper-
cussions for the work of the organization.15
WHO over the years has been challenged — for 
many different reasons — in relation to different forms 
of legitimacy. The criticism that was most damaging 
for the organization in the 1990s relates to results-
based legitimacy. WHO was increasingly seen as not 
responding adequately to global health problems; 
its outputs were judged unsatisfactory by a number 
of important actors and even its moral standing was 
questioned in relation to its leadership. In this period 
the new organizations based on results based legiti-
macy gained significant strength, made possible by 
the significant resource flow into global health and a 
new paradigm of market multilateralism.16 The entry 
of many new actors in the global health arena has led 
to a dispersal of legitimacy and new organizations can 
lay claim to legitimacy based on results, expertise, and 
moral standing. Any attempt to coordinate actors in 
the global health arena must balance actors with very 
different forms of legitimacy. It seems obvious that 
the organization’s attempting any such coordination 
would need to be strong on a number of dimensions of 
legitimacy; otherwise, it would not have the authority 
to act. 
As Dr. Chan stated,17 leadership must be earned — 
an institution is perceived as legitimate not only if it is 
constitutionally the most appropriate one for the issue 
at stake, but approval for that institution needs to be 
general among those who will be subject to its author-
ity. We believe that the WHO through its unique com-
bination of formal-legal legitimacy, combined with 
expertise based legitimacy and moral standing, still is 
the organization that can demonstrate legitimacy for 
coordination of global health more than others. WHO 
has responded in many ways to the increasing diver-
sity of global health actors and already become host to 
a multitude of partnerships and alliances. In our view 
results-based legitimacy in relation to the WHO must 
not be sought in areas for which it is not the appro-
priate organization to act — i.e., implementation of 
health programmes in developing countries — but in 
the results linked to establishing principles, norms, 
and rules such as the adoption of two major global 
health treaties, the significant work done in standard 
setting, advice to countries, the development of inno-
vative health strategies, the eradication of major dis-
eases such as small pox and its results in responding 
to global outbreaks, etc. It is in these areas of work 
that WHO must be judged in terms of results, and a 
discussion needs to be conducted whether it has the 
means at its disposal to fulfil these constitutional func-
tions adequately, particularly in the domain of “health 
security” and with regard to global public goods for 
health. 
1989: Dispersed Legitimacy and the 
Expansion of Actors 
It is important to realize the extent to which the con-
stitution of the World Health Organization represents 
a major governance innovation — from the start its 
task was to reach out beyond the member states only. 
When at its inception in 1948 the WHO was entrusted 
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with the task of acting as “the directing and co-ordi-
nating authority on international health work,” this 
was understood as establishing and maintaining effec-
tive collaboration with the United Nations, specialized 
agencies, governmental health administrations, pro-
fessional groups, and other such organizations that 
may be deemed appropriate by the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization, Chapters 2 a. and b.
 Chapter XVI of the WHO constitution (articles 
69-72) calls not only for close cooperation with U.N. 
and specialized agencies, it goes further and author-
izes the organization to make arrangements for con-
sultations and co-operation with non-governmental 
international organizations, and even, subject to the 
governments’ consent, with national organizations. 
“This latter clause is commonly regarded as being 
potentially among the most fruitful innovations intro-
duced by post-second world war international legisla-
tion.”18 This clause built on decades of experience with 
the extensive participation of non-state organizations 
in national and international health work: Medical 
Associations, the Red Cross, foundations, and above 
all missionary and philanthropic activities had been 
active in international health for at least a century. 
The role of the Rockefeller Foundation had been par-
ticularly important: for example during the 1920s, it 
financed between a third and half of the League of 
Nations Health Office budget.19 The parallels to the 
dominant position of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation today — who in 2007 spent roughly as much 
on global health as WHO’s budget for that year — are 
obvious.20
Existing health organizations (such as the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau) were integrated into the 
WHO as regional offices to ensure coordination, and 
new offices at regional and country level were created 
to ensure a worldwide presence. Until the 1970s the 
WHO remained unchallenged as the leading inter-
national organization in health. Financial support by 
non-state actors played a negligible role, and a small 
number of NGOs had a well-defined role as observers 
with a rather limited impact on international health 
affairs. Two factors led to major change: the rise of 
development assistance and the rivalry between dif-
ferent models of providing health care in developing 
countries, which was symbolized through the con-
flict between comprehensive primary health care and 
selective primary health care.21 Together these began 
to challenge WHO’s hegemony and created com-
petition among organizations that was detrimental 
to health. For example, UNICEF’s move to provide 
large-scale immunization programs and the entry of 
the World Bank into health care financing both under-
mined efforts to establish sustainable health systems 
in developing countries. This was followed by the rise 
of the civil society organizations, initially organized 
around women’s health, HIV/AIDS and human rights 
and health, but expanding into ever more areas of 
action and advocacy.
The processes of globalization catapulted health 
to a more prominent political place on the global 
agenda and many new actors entered the global health 
arena, initially in relation to the development agenda. 
Together they formed collective action of a new type, 
moving beyond the nation state. In particular they cre-
ated hybrid alliances or organizations — frequently 
called public private partnerships — in pursuit of spe-
cific health goals. A fundamental change in govern-
ance began to take shape — market multilateralism — 
and many networks and alliances have brought nation 
states, civil society organizations, private foundations, 
pharmaceutical corporations, and international organ-
izations together to address development challenges. 
They now have a significant impact on setting agen-
das, shaping global health policies and implementing 
programs. Their sheer number is staggering: a 2007 
estimate of AIDS-related NGOs alone counted more 
than 60,000.22 More than 200 public-private partner-
ships are operating in fields such as developing new 
medicines for neglected diseases, improving access 
to medical treatment or pooling resources for specific 
goals. While they have gained increasing power they 
“suffer from problems of legitimacy and accountabil-
ity, in part, due to a lack of transparency and, in part, 
due to the nature of their membership, which is domi-
nated by developed countries.”23
Beyond the development agenda a wide range of 
factors have contributed to the increasing consider-
ation paid to global health by different actors: 
Inequality of access•   to health around the world 
has gained more attention and has become a 
major issue of human rights and social justice. 
Health threats•   such as influenza, SARS, or 
avian flu threaten every country and the global 
community as a whole due to the rapid spread 
based on global travel and mobility. Their 
impact frequently has very serious economic 
repercussions. 
The •  globalization of lifestyles has led to com-
mon chronic disease challenges such as diabetes 
and is linked to the impact of global industries, 
including those of tobacco, alcohol, and food. 
The health sector is a •  critical sector for stabil-
ity in many countries, and health care financing 
is a key political issue in all countries. The mobil-
ity of patients and health care professionals is a 
global issue
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Health is •  one of the largest industries world-
wide, critical issues — for example, intellectual 
property and trade in goods and services — have 
major economic consequences for companies 
and countries, and major consequences in terms 
of access for poor people and countries.
Consequently, global health has become a concern and 
at times a precondition for quite a number of policy 
fields like economic policy, foreign policy, geopolitics, 
security policy, investment and marketing strategies, 
and human rights. This is part of the reason why there 
are so many different interpretations and usages of the 
term “global health.”24 People tend to apply the refer-
ence frame and interest from which they themselves 
approach the global health agenda. This diversity in 
the way in which global health is understood leads to 
many misunderstandings and illuminates that some 
of the problems of coherence and coordination are 
due not only to the lack of institutional mechanisms 
or an unwillingness to cooperate but also to very dif-
ferent mindsets of the actors involved.25 
2010: Need for Coherence and Coordination 
WHO was initially ill prepared to respond strategi-
cally to the new importance health gained first in the 
global development agenda and later in the security 
agenda. It was in the arena of development assistance 
that WHO has been most radically challenged, since 
it was not set up to deliver interventions at country 
level. At the same time (true to its mandate on setting 
norms and standards) one of the most quoted refer-
ence points in the development debate — the report of 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health26 — 
was initiated by the organization. It was in the arena 
of health security — the arena close to its constitu-
tional functions — that WHO regained much of its 
strength through the rapid action in relation to SARS 
and the adoption of the revised International Health 
Regulations. Many health NGOs also re-established 
trust in the WHO in the course of the negotiations of 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and 
the Report of the Commission on Social Determinants 
of Health.27
The projected “weakness” of the WHO became 
most palpable as HIV/AIDS spread around the globe 
at astonishing speed in the 1990s while WHO was 
engaged in internal conflicts, which followed after a 
period of strong and clear moral leadership. It was rein-
forced when WHO was not considered active enough 
in relation to the “health goals” of the Millennium 
Development Goals, and through the presence of new 
donors with significant resources, first and foremost 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Furthermore, it 
did not help that many of the new players expected the 
wrong things from the WHO. Many did not — or did 
not want to — understand WHO’s unique governance 
function which lies in establishing principles, norms, 
and rules, i.e., creating legal instruments, develop-
ing global strategies that provide direction, setting 
norms and standards, and coordinating global efforts 
in eradication and disease control where appropriate. 
The critique of many well-meaning global health play-
ers of the WHO inadvertently played into the hands of 
those who wanted to see the organization’s legal and 
normative functions weakened, be it some member 
states or some trans-national companies. 
Many of the new alliances and networks have 
focused on specific health problems through result-ori-
ented strategies and have been able to act with speed, 
flexibility, and innovation. For many different reasons, 
many of these actors initially bypassed the WHO. 
Global health has become a concern and at times a precondition for quite a 
number of policy fields like economic policy, foreign policy, geopolitics, security 
policy, investment and marketing strategies, and human rights. This is part of 
the reason why there are so many different interpretations and usages of the 
term “global health.” People tend to apply the reference frame and interest from 
which they themselves approach the global health agenda. This diversity in the 
way in which global health is understood leads to many misunderstandings 
and illuminates that some of the problems of coherence and coordination are 
due not only to the lack of institutional mechanisms or an unwillingness to 
cooperate but also to very different mindsets of the actors involved.
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New issue-based organizations such as the GFATM 
and GAVI were created, introducing new governing 
structures, which included both state and non-state 
actors including the private sector. It was implied — 
and sometimes heralded — that such public-private 
governance structures had higher legitimacy than the 
purely state-based legitimacy of the WHO. It is quite 
clear that in the period of unilateralism there was no 
interest by the hegemonic U.S.A. to strengthen a U.N.-
based organization. Thus, in the 1990s WHO was 
pushed into the frame of a development organization 
and began to compete for funding of programs with 
the many other actors; as a result, for a period it lost 
much of its influence and strategic purpose. 
Overall the many new health initiatives and actors 
have put health high on the global development agenda 
and had an important effect on priority setting. More 
recently though many analyses have shown that they 
have also achieved the following:
reinforced the verticalization of approaches to • 
resolve global health challenges;
bred competition among actors on the ground • 
and in the international arena;
created expensive transaction costs for donors • 
having to deal with so many organizations and 
initiatives;
created a burden for ministries of health in • 
recipient countries having to work with and 
report to a multitude of partners; 
led to fragmented health programmes that com-• 
pete for limited numbers of trained staff at the 
country level, but also internationally; and
weakened support to health systems. • 
As a consequence, the great optimism that initially 
accompanied these developments has gradually been 
tempered. A consensus is emerging that their success 
was achieved at the cost of fragmentation, created 
ineffective parallel activities, neglected the need to 
strengthen health systems, and increased problems of 
transparency and accountability at all levels of govern-
ance. But the reproach that is probably most serious 
for a movement that has results as its major claim to 
legitimacy is that not only are the counterproductive 
system effects being debated, but their overall health 
impact is also being questioned.28 Many actors in the 
global health arena have begun to recognize that the 
institutional proliferation and complexity in global 
health requires additional coherence and coordina-
tion mechanisms in order to make an effective use of 
available resources. 
Global Development Coordination 
The coordination efforts that have been established 
center on problems related to development coopera-
tion, in particular the Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness and subsequently the Accra Declaration.29 The 
most important initiative in this context is the Interna-
tional Health Partnership+ which aims at coordinat-
ing the activities of all relevant donor organizations.30 
The paradigmatic character of “health” as a problem of 
“aid effectiveness” has been recognized by the OECD 
and the World Bank (the leading organizations of the 
aid effectiveness process) as a “tracer sector” to be used 
as a “litmus test for broader aid effectiveness efforts.”31 
The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action 
on enhanced Aid Effectiveness have agreed on a set 
of principles: 
Ownership •  — developing countries set their own 
strategies for poverty reduction, improve their 
institutions and tackle corruption.
Alignment •  — donor countries align behind these 
objectives and use local systems.
Harmonization •  — donor countries coordinate, 
simplify procedures and share information to 
avoid duplication.
Results •  — developing countries and donors shift 
focus to development results and results get 
measured.
Mutual Accountability •  — donors and partners 
are accountable for development results.
Predictability — donors will provide information • 
3-5 years in advance of their plan to aid partner 
countries.
Country Systems •  — partner country systems will 
be used to deliver aid as the first option, rather 
than donor systems.
Conditionality •  — donors will switch from reli-
ance on prescriptive conditions about how and 
when aid money is spent to conditions based 
on the developing country’s own development 
objectives.
Untying •  — donors will relax restrictions that 
prevent developing countries from buying the 
goods and services they need from whomever 
and wherever they can get the best quality at the 
lowest price.
With regard to donor-financed health programs, these 
principles clearly hold and are of high relevance. But 
additional accountability of a wider nature is also 
required: for example, it needs a debate why donor 
agencies do not act in accordance with major policy 
principles of the World Health Organization or with 
the World Health Assembly resolutions in implement
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ing their health strategies. We believe that this kind of 
debate needs to take place under the auspices of the 
World Health Assembly with the involvement of the 
many actors concerned in order to establish principles, 
norms, and rules for development action in health. 
Possibly this could lead to the type of Framework Con-
vention on Global Health that has been proposed by 
Lawrence Gostin.32
Global Public Goods Coordination 
But the global health governance responsibility of the 
WHO does not lie foremost in the donor-recipient-
relationships. It is to a large degree concerned with the 
provision of global public goods, e.g., securing access 
to vaccines or succeeding to eradicate a virus, monitor-
ing the spread of an infectious disease and enforcing 
travel restrictions, implementing measures of tobacco 
control, supporting the diagnostic capacity in remote 
parts of the world, or promoting systems of research for 
neglected diseases — all of which have benefits for the 
entire global community but require the investment 
of a large spectrum of actors whose primary objectives 
may or may not be related to health outcomes. In some 
cases — in particular with regard to health-related 
knowledge closely linked to the production of medi-
cines — the question of publicness is closely entwined 
with aspects of health equity, the relationship between 
intellectual property rights, prices of medicines and 
access to them. It is here in the area of establishing 
principles, norms, and rules for global public goods 
for health that we see the greatest opportunities for 
a new kind of debate at the World Health Assembly 
with the involvement of the many actors concerned, 
particularly those beyond the health sector.
From International to Global Health 
Governance
Intergovernmental organizations have been estab-
lished whenever governments recognized a common 
interest to create a minimum of continuous coordi-
native capacity at the international level. This clearly 
happened in 1948 when the WHO was established. 
These organizations are legitimized by the consent of 
participating sovereign states, as their governing bod-
ies are representative of national governments. How-
ever, globalization has put this system of intergovern-
mental organization under stress. On the one hand, 
both the slowness of decision making within many 
intergovernmental organizations and the problems 
of representation are criticized. On the other hand, 
the mounting interconnectivity and the increase of 
trans-national social relations imply a growing need 
for rules of the game and increase the importance of 
international agreements and norms, which are devel-
oped in the context of these very institutions.34 
WHO was set up as an intergovernmental orga-
nization (IGO) with three organs: the World Health 
Assembly, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat. 
The Executive Board was originally conceived as a 
body of experts technically qualified in the field of 
health. Its members were to “exercise power delegated 
to them by the Conference on behalf of the whole Con-
ference, and not as representatives of their respective 
governments.” The Executive Board then presented 
its deliberations to the representatives of the member 
states at the WHA — a unique construct of mixing pro-
fessional and political decision-making power. This 
was then changed (in the late 1990s) so that members 
of the Executive Board now represent their countries, 
Box 4: Public Goods and Global Public Goods
A public good is defined according to two characteristics: rivalry 
and exclusivity. A public good is a good which is non-rivalling in 
consumption and the access to which cannot be excluded.
If one person’s consumption of a good completely pre-
cludes anyone else’s ability to enjoy that good, then it 
is strictly private. For instance, one person’s car cannot 
be simultaneously driven by someone else. But it is not 
always so black and white. A bus system has public char-
acteristics in that everyone with a pass has access to that 
mode of transportation. And yet, there is some degree 
of rivalry because there are only so many seats, and of 
course, someone who cannot afford a bus ticket will be 
excluded from the system entirely. This framework is 
important for determining how a good ought to be pro-
duced.  A purely private good will be handled by the mar-
ket, whereas varying degrees of publicness demand state 
intervention to ensure sufficient production for equitable 
consumption. The public goods concept has tradition-
ally been understood in terms of national economy and 
government, for which a single policy-making body has 
control over the publicness of a good’s production and 
the balancing of positive and negative externalities.
In a global economy challenges arise because nationally 
produced goods have impacts across borders, which 
means that consumption may be completely discon-
nected from the decision-making process that creates 
that good. Therefore, the international community has 
increasingly recognized that production and management 
of certain goods (i.e., clean air) must be managed at the 
supranational level both to prevent free-riding where one 
state pays for the good but others benefit, and to make 
sure that all those impacted by the goods production can 
participate in its provision in some way.33
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reflecting the increased politicization of the organiza-
tion. Of course, WHO negotiations have always been 
subject to a wide range of interests, to coalition and 
bloc building processes among nations as well as to 
periodic attempts to curtail the autonomy of the orga-
nization by powerful states — at times the organiza-
tion has come close to paralysis. The negotiations can 
be tedious and lacking in transparency, and they are 
not always as focused on health as one would wish 
them to be. The tradition of working by consensus is 
felt by many to be frustrating and outdated.
Such problems common to all international organi-
zations have certainly played a role in stimulating new 
actors to move into the health arena and to search for 
new institutional arrangements that would work “bet-
ter” than the WHO. In health the tangible outcome 
— often reflected in life or death — creates a pressure 
and dynamic of its own, not as present in other areas of 
global policy. But it is also the nation states themselves 
that have weakened their organization, in particular 
through the ceiling put on the assessed contributions 
since the so-called United Nations Reform Act (Helms-
Biden Act), a 1999 U.S. law that set a number of con-
ditions for reform of the U.N. system before the U.S. 
would release its total amount of arrears in payment 
to the U.N. This introduced the principle of zero nom-
inal growth into the WHO budget process and forced 
the organization to be dependent on extra budgetary 
resources, a relationship that is now at about 20:80 
in favour of extra budgetary resources. This becomes 
a problem when the WHO is forced to compete for 
funding with others bodies, NGOs and even coun-
tries because the “steady shift to a competitive model 
of funding runs the risks of undermining their crucial 
role as trusted neutral brokers between the scientific 
and the technical communities on the one hand, and 
governments of developing countries on the other.”35 
It can also undermine WHO’s strength as an organiza-
tion that establishes international law and sets norms 
and standards — a function that should be largely sup-
ported by reliable regular budgetary resources. 
This lack of resources for global policy development 
also becomes relevant in view of the growing inter-
dependence between various policy fields in inter- 
and trans-national relations in global health. Health 
increasingly is part of the deliberations of organiza-
tions not dedicated to health — because their actions 
have a high health impact.36 Negotiations on trade, 
food, and climate change are obvious examples, and 
WHO both needs to be able to have a higher involve-
ment and bring those debates into the organization, 
both of which are resource intensive. From its incep-
tion the WHO had close cooperation with the United 
Nations and ECOSOC, and negotiated agreements 
with many intergovernmental organizations such as 
the following: UNICEF in the field of child health; 
FAO concerning food safety; the International Labour 
Organization concerning occu-
pational safety and the health 
of workers; UNESCO regarding 
scientific documentation; and 
the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. One of the first 
tasks of the Executive Board 
was to appoint the WHO mem-
bers of the UNICEF/WHO joint 
committee on Health Policy. 
But the list of organizations and 
policy arenas is ever expand-
ing: new U.N. organizations 
for health have been created such as UNAIDS, other 
bodies such as the World Bank, WTO, WIPO, UNDP, 
and UNCTAD have become increasingly involved in 
health affairs because of the health impacts of their 
policies. In response WHO needs expertise in these 
areas to be able to contribute effectively in relation to 
these health impacts and consequences. Clearly there 
is an increasing interdependence in the norm-setting 
process (for example intellectual property and health) 
and an increase in joint operational activities of inter-
governmental organizations. This has increased the 
expectations put on the WHO but not the resources 
available to do so.
The recent period has also been characterized by a 
new geopolitical challenge to the existing system of 
intergovernmental institutions which will also have 
an impact on global health governance. Like other 
arenas of governance, the field of global health gov-
ernance is subject to reconfigurations of power — it 
is always also a political undertaking, which allows 
new actors to mobilize discursive as well as finan-
cial resources to challenge the power of established 
actors.37 The recent negotiations in December 2009 at 
the Climate Summit in Copenhagen have shown some 
of these new trends very clearly: a defining role by the 
Clearly there is an increasing interdependence 
in the norm-setting process (for example 
intellectual property and health) and an increase 
in joint operational activities of intergovernmental 
organizations. This has increased the expectations put 
on the WHO but not the resources available to do so.
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emerging economies, a final document negotiated at 
the highest level by a group of 30, and a refusal of the 
full Summit Assembly to approve the document.38 In 
the wake of the summit, there was increasing criticism 
that while the need for collective action has become 
ever more urgent, the large U.N. Assemblies no longer 
seem capable of producing results based on consensus. 
Already there is a clear tendency of countries to use 
club models in addition to the processes of established 
international organizations — basically undemocratic 
institutions.39 These can take many different forms: 
They can be at the level of heads of state — • 
established first by industrialized countries 
(such as the G7/G8 meetings and a strengthened 
role of the OECD), now also increasingly by the 
emerging economies (IBSA). 
More recently the global power shift has led • 
to the establishment of the G20 and the role 
of regional bodies like the European Union is 
increasing at the global governance level. 
New proposals have launched the term “minilat-• 
eralism”40 — an approach that should bring to 
the table the smallest possible number of actors 
with the largest possible impact on solving a par-
ticular problem. 
And finally there is the increasing alliance • 
between middle powers and civil society actors 
as exemplified in the process for the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICC). 
The challenge at present is how WHO and its govern-
ing bodies are positioned in this period of geopoliti-
cal transition in relation to such club models - raising 
issues of legitimacy and accountability, for example, 
in relation to the World Health Assembly. While one 
would, of course, want to see a strong health commit-
ment from “high policy” bodies, the issue remains how 
that is influenced by and fed back into the coordinat-
ing authority for health.
Networked Global Health Governance:  
The New Diplomacy 
This dynamic interaction of the many players in global 
health is usually captured by the concept of “govern-
ance.” While a government “governs” by using its con-
stitutional powers to pursue specific goals, the term 
“governance” rather looks at the interactive processes 
between different actors in the absence of a central 
authority which lead to a specific outcome. It has fre-
quently been associated with “governance without 
government,” a view that is increasingly challenged as 
the role of states in the global governance system is 
better understood. Indeed since the global financial 
crisis, the state has come back on the international 
scene very forcefully. The Commission on Global Gov-
ernance (1996) has suggested a standard definition of 
global governance stating that “governance is the sum 
of many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs. It is a continu-
ing process through which conflicting or diverse inter-
ests may be accommodated and co-operative action 
taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes 
empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have 
agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.” 41 
We have already outlined that contemporary global 
health governance is characterized by a polycentric, 
distributed structure. It has become a complex web 
of state and non-state actors, and it is defined by the 
interplay of different institutional forms and actors at 
many different levels. There are new resources, new 
financing arrangements, new organizational struc-
tures, and new international agreements. There are 
new processes, highly flexible networks, partnerships, 
new interfaces, and a multitude of information sys-
tems, thus creating a more complex interface than in 
most other sectors of global action. Transnational cor-
porations (TNCs), foundations, civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs), and various other forms of private asso-
ciations are progressively forming the civic foundation 
of a global polity which makes its presence felt in many 
different ways in international organizations.42 Thus, 
depending on the vantage point, one can see global 
health governance as a creative plurality, fragmenta-
tion, or anarchy of actors. 
These actors defend their own interests, pursue 
advocacy positions, and exert political pressure from 
inside national polities as well as on the global level. 
They take sides in public conflicts, lobby, and use vari-
ous media and the internet to spread their positions. 
They also offer resources (financial as well as exper-
tise) from outside the state system for the achieve-
ment of public goals. Proactively, they associate with 
national as well as international state actors to form 
hybrid alliances or organization. Non-state actors can 
also play a significant role in developing transnational 
norms and play an important role in building and 
defending international law, e.g., in the field of human 
rights. This process which has been termed the “new 
diplomacy” is most clearly exemplified by the “Ottawa 
Process” which led to the treaty banning anti-person-
nel land mines and by the Rome Statute to establish 
the International Criminal Court.43 In these cases 
such new forms of alliance building basically allowed 
the bypassing of many major governmental players 
opposed to the agreements. 
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Today, trans-national discourses on health — also 
magnified through the media and the internet — are 
very important in raising issues, setting agendas, and 
in particular, producing the discursive frames, in 
which problems are then debated in intergovernmen-
tal organizations and other international fora. The 
increasing density of trans-national communication 
creates a new dynamic and a dense web of exchange. 
Specific actors or institutions emerge as nodes of infor-
mation and coordination and the interactions taking 
place may reshape the goals, perceptions, interests, and 
relationships of the various actors.44 In global health 
this is exemplified by the Access to Medicines Cam-
paign. One way to understand these interactions is to 
consider them as networked governance. Networked 
governance is a specific form of organization because 
it depends on governing nodes. A node must have 
some institutional form, even if temporary. It need not 
be a formally constituted or legally recognized entity, 
but it must have sufficient stability and structure to 
enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities, 
and technologies over time; many global movements 
have such nodes. Given the many players, networks, 
and alliances in global health (which all have their 
respective nodes), there is a need for a “superstruc-
tural node,” which brings together representatives of 
different nodal organizations. Superstructural nodes 
are the command centers of networked governance.45 
They concentrate the members’ resources and tech-
nologies for a common purpose but do not integrate 
the various networks into a common structure. This 
type of thinking is at the basis of our suggestion for a 
Committee C because we consider the World Health 
Assembly a “superstructural node” of networked glo-
bal health governance. 
The World Health Assembly as a 
“Superstructural Node”: Committee C
There is now a growing recognition that a side lin-
ing and weakening of international organizations in 
global governance — in this case the World Health 
Organization — can prove counterproductive and 
may harm efforts to improve health around the world. 
This has brought the question of the WHO’s role to 
“act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on 
international health work” back on the global health 
governance agenda. Can WHO be part of the solution 
to improve global health governance? Does it have 
instruments already at its disposal that could help fill 
the governance void described above? Can it adapt to 
networked governance?
The institutional proliferation and complexity in 
global health requires coordination mechanisms that 
are broadly accepted and work to the principle of 
networked governance. The World Health Assembly 
(WHA) already has a central position as a “superstruc-
tural node” in global health governance. It is now a 
unique meeting place of global health actors. Indeed 
global health governance — more than other arenas 
of global action — is particularly illustrative of a new 
relationship between state based entities and non-
state entities. The World Health Assembly fully illus-
trates this:
On the one hand the WHA ensures the interface • 
between the delegates of its members (nation 
states) and the interface of the delegates with 
the representatives of many other global health 
actors. Quite independent from what is being 
discussed in the formal agenda of the Assembly 
the new “polylateral diplomacy”46 is conducted 
throughout the WHA: formal and informal 
meetings take place, agreements are reached, 
deals are struck, NGOs exert influence, the pri-
vate sector lobbies, receptions are organized. In 
short, key global health players participate in 
the Assembly during this period, even if they are 
not part of the formal meetings at the Palais des 
Nations. 
On the other hand, the formal processes of the • 
World Health Assembly continue to guarantee a 
legitimate decision-making process that allows 
the interests of nations which are otherwise 
not powerfully represented in many of the net-
worked global governance processes or the club 
models to express themselves and to contribute 
to a decision-making process which is defined 
first and foremost through its formal-legal legiti-
macy, but also carries other forms of legitimacy 
within it. 
The challenge for the WHO is to provide an interface 
— the polylateral diplomacy venue — between these 
two types of nodal governance through the World 
Health Assembly. 
The premise of our proposal is that the World Health 
Organization should be strengthened to fulfil its con-
stitutional mandate. But it needs to develop new mech-
anisms to apply this mandate to the changed realities 
of the 21st century. Coordination in the 21st century 
means establishing coherence through hard and soft 
power, norms and networking, through transparency 
and accountability. We propose that the World Health 
Assembly — not the WHO secretariat — as the total-
ity of member states and the prime governing body 
with formal-legal legitimacy within global health 
governance should be at the core of any such mecha-
nism. We are convinced that — in line with WHO’s 
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constitution — the overall normative and strategic 
coordination of global health action should be the task 
of the WHA and thereby be approved by the delega-
tions representing all governments of the world, but a 
broader input base into the decision making process is 
clearly necessary. We are proposing a mechanism that 
does not need a change of the WHO constitution and 
could be implemented rapidly if the political will were 
mobilized. 
Through Article 2 of its constitution WHO has a 
constitutional mandate to address global health issues 
in general and not only the governance of WHO itself. 
Until now, the global coordinating function of WHO 
has not been formally recognized by many of the new 
partners; indeed, several maintain that they have come 
into existence precisely because the WHO system does 
not work well enough to meet global health challenges. 
However, few of these partners can work without a 
link with WHO, particularly those at the country level. 
The WHA meets once a year and is attended by dele-
gations from all of WHO’s 193 member states; it is the 
G193. The WHA mostly takes its decisions by debat-
ing and adopting resolutions (which are non-binding 
in nature — i.e., soft law), but it also has the authority 
to adopt binding international health law, such as the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the 
International Health Regulations. 
All member states, no matter how small or poor, 
are represented at the WHA. It is the poorest that are 
most effected by the lack of coherence and coordina-
tion. This means that they would have a voice in the 
Committee C debates. All other new mechanisms for 
coordination at present — like H8 or IHP or the G20 
— are club models which exclude them. The clubs are 
important but they are not transparent and member-
ship is exclusive. Not only do NGOs not have enough 
voice in the global governance process, the same also 
applies to a range of poor countries in the face of donor 
pressure. We believe that having to negotiate in public 
will over time make a difference. Major global health 
actors have to be challenged in a legitimate forum as to 
the systemic impact or the unintended consequences 
of their actions. 
Currently, the formal work of the WHA is focused on 
determining the policies of WHO itself and on mak-
ing recommendations for member states. Currently 
the WHA prepares its resolutions and the decisions 
to be taken by its plenary in two main committees: 
Committee A dealing with programme matters, and 
Committee B with budget and managerial concerns. 
The mechanism we propose is to consider the estab-
lishment of a Committee C of the WHA which deals 
with coherence, partnership, and coordination. We 
have built our proposal for a Committee C on article 18 
of WHO’s constitution where there are at least three 
provisions that allow an entry point for establishing a 
mechanism to ensure more transparency and debate 
between global health players:
“to establish such committees as may be consid-• 
ered necessary for the work of the Organization”; 
“to instruct the Board and the Director-General • 
to bring to the attention of Members and of 
international organizations, governmental or 
non-governmental, any matter with regard to, 
health which the Health Assembly may consider 
appropriate”; and 
“to invite any organization, international or • 
national, governmental or non-governmental, 
which has responsibilities related to those of 
the Organization, to appoint representatives to 
participate, without right of vote, in its meetings 
or in those of the committees and conferences 
convened under its authority, on conditions pre-
scribed by the Health Assembly; but in the case 
of national organizations, invitations shall be 
issued only with the consent of the government 
concerned.”
Of course coordination in global health governance is 
not a goal in itself, broader levels of cooperation aim to 
provide more fairness, more security and more effec-
tiveness through increased coherence in global health 
policy and programmes. The starting point is shared 
interest rather than coercion in achieving a common 
goal. Critical mechanisms are dialogue, transparency, 
and accountability within a context of nodal gover-
nance. To better understand the function of Commit-
tee C it is useful to distinguish operative, normative, or 
strategic mechanisms of coordination. 
Operative mechanisms•   come into existence 
mainly for the purpose of implementation, with 
a focus on activities dealing with procurement, 
distribution and delivery on the ground, but also 
in the coordination of concrete research and 
planning processes. 
Normative coordination•   seeks to align the value 
systems and standards of multiple actors and 
build consensus among sometimes vastly differ-
ent stakeholders in health initiatives. 
Strategic (or programmatic) coordination•   
applies to mechanisms which help to develop a 
specific strategy to reach a broader goal in global 
health, aiming at developing a programme 
which is acceptable to a larger group of different 
actors or to rally support behind a rather broadly 
defined strategy. This is basically a political task, 
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frequently performed by intergovernmental 
organizations, but also by broader policy net-
works. It links normative and operative aspects, 
understanding that a particularly underlying 
agenda must be compatible with the normative 
frameworks of actors involved and links that to 
both standard-setting and implementation. It 
implies an acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
coordination institution or network.
Committee C clearly deals with the latter two forms 
of coordination: normative and strategic. First and 
foremost there must be agreement on the normative 
framework upon which global health governance can 
be built. Committee C would provide the opportunity 
for global health players and organizations to pres-
ent their plans and achievements to the delegates of 
the WHA, to each other and the non-governmental 
organizations in official relations with WHO. In doing 
so it would create a new type of accountability and 
transparency in global health. It would also provide 
an opportunity to address coordination and common 
concerns of different players in global health. 
A Committee C would need rules of procedure 
that give sufficient space to these players while fully 
respecting the role of governmental delegations. Such 
a double requirement could be met by proposing 
resolutions for adoption by the plenary of WHA as in 
committees A and B, but to explicitly welcome within 
such resolutions commitments independently taken 
by other partners that would be annexed to the reso-
lution. With such a procedure the other entities keep 
their full independence by autonomously adopting – 
according to their internal rules – their declarations 
to be annexed. There is an interaction between the 
member states and the other entities in Committee C 
on the conditions and methods under which to annexe 
a declaration and the core of the resolution. Member 
states keep their sovereignty in the final adoption of 
the resolution in the WHA plenary where other stake-
holders cannot vote or intervene.
In short, Committee C would be a workable mecha-
nism to improve consistency of global health action 
and coordination between many partners while 
respecting their independence and decision-making 
structure. The suggestion of a Committee C is not to 
create an NGO Forum within the WHA. At the center 
of our concern is the governance challenge we set out 
at the beginning: for the WHO to provide mechanisms 
and instruments which let it achieve the following:
Link the new global health actors to the system • 
of multilateral intergovernmental institutions, in 
particular the WHO; 
Engage in new ways with the many non-health • 
actors that can influence health both positively 
and negatively;
Perform its coordination function in relation • 
to the development of legal instruments with a 
broader range of players.
We wanted to construct a transparency and account-
ability mechanism for major actors in global health 
governance and bring their voices into the WHA. 
This seems to us to be critical. Where else could the 
international health community better debate the pol-
icy priorities and approaches of major players? Why 
not use the existing mechanism and organizational 
infrastructure of the World Health Assembly? Even 
though this would only be one of the necessary steps to 
improve coordination in global health, such a mecha-
nism would help to meet several challenges faced by 
the current fragmentation in global heath. 
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